Quote:
nuala kaže:
čitanje o vremenu kroz povijest filozofije je pokazalo ovo: ideje samog vremena bile su često pogrešne - dok su stvari vezane uz vrijeme, kao što je kretanje, nastajanje, mogućnost i zbiljnost (kao samo neke od njih) - bile daleko zdravije postavljene nego što ih danas većina ljudi poima.
|
“Naš naivan pojam vremena pretpostavlja da ... , no opća teorija relativnosti pokazala je kako ...”; “Kantova koncepcija prostora je ..., međutim s dokazom konzistentnosti neeuklidskih geometrija jasno je da ...”; ...
Rečenice ovog oblika redovito se ponavljaju kad govorimo o znanosti. “Znanost ruši naše baštinjene svakodnevne predrasude”, kažemo, “pokazuje da stvari nisu zapravo onakve kakvima ih je držalo naivno mišljenje ili mračna filozofija.”
No sve što bi ovdje moglo biti naivno ili mračno jest određena koncepcija jezika – promatranje riječî našeg jezika kao svih više-manje sličnih imenima. ‘Vrijeme’ i ‘prostor’ tek su imena tih-i-tih stvari o kojima smo, eto, do maloprije vjerovali pogrešne stvari. Otprilike kao kad bih rekao: “Vjerovao sam da je moj pas dobar čuvar, no pokazalo se da se boji neznanaca.” Ili: “Da, govorimo o istom čovjeku, no on nije matematičar, već filozof.”
"
It might be found practical to call a certain state of decay in a tooth, not accompanied by what we commonly call toothache, “unconscious toothache” and to use in such a case the expression that we have toothache, but don't know it. It is in just this sense that psychoanalysis talks of unconscious thoughts, acts of volition, etc. Now is it wrong in this sense to say that I have toothache but don't know it? There is nothing wrong about it, as it is just a new terminology and can at any time be retranslated into ordinary language. On the other hand it obviously makes use of the word “to know” in a new way. If you wish to examine how this expression is used it is helpful to ask yourself “what in this case is the process of getting to know like?” “What do we call ‘getting to know’ or, ‘finding out’?”
It isn't wrong, according to our new convention, to say “I have unconscious toothache”. For what more can you ask of your notation than that it should distinguish between a bad tooth which doesn't give you toothache and one which does? But the new expression misleads us by calling up pictures and analogies which make it difficult for us to go through with our convention. And it is extremely difficult to discard these pictures unless we are constantly watchful; particularly difficult when, in philosophizing, we contemplate what we say
about things. Thus, by the expression “unconscious toothache” you may either be misled into thinking that a stupendous discovery has been made, a discovery which in a sense altogether bewilders our understanding; or else you may be extremely puzzled by the expression (the puzzlement of philosophy) and perhaps ask such a question as “How is unconscious toothache possible?” You may then be tempted to deny the possibility of unconscious toothache; but the scientist will tell you that it is a proved fact that there is such a thing, and he will say it like a man who is destroying a common prejudice. He will say: “Surely it's quite simple; there are other things which you don't know of, and there can also be toothache which you don't know of. It is just a new discovery”. You won't be satisfied, but you won't know what to answer. This situation constantly arises between the scientist and the philosopher.
In such a case we may clear the matter up by saying: “Let's see how the word ‘unconscious’, ‘to know’, etc. etc., is used in this
case, and how it's used in others”. How far does the analogy between these uses go?"
(Wittgenstein, L. (1965)
The Blue and Brown Books, (New York: Harper Torchbooks), str 22-3. U tekstu se nigdje ne spominje izravno teorija relativnosti, no nekoliko stranica kasnije osvrće se upravo na pitanje “Što je vrijeme?”. Osim toga, očita je jaka analogija između ‘vrijeme’ i ‘nesvjesna zubobolja’ iz citiranog odlomka.)