Istina o padu krajine i podjeli Bosne

[matematicar]

Bojnik kaže:

Opet se Srbi tješe...izdaja,izdaja!

Što bi oni izgubili rat,a kamoli 3 rata!

Izgubili ste jer ste totalno nesposobni! To se i danas vidi! Dvanaest godina nakon rata,a vi ostali zaostali kao i 95.

Jebiga lako ste živjeli dok ste imali nas da vas hranimo,al otišlo...sad treba radit,al vam baš neide,ko i ratovanje.
što ono Slobo reče...ako ništa drugo Srbin zna da se bije.E ni to nezna!

Prije bi se moglo reci da se ti ponasas kao da i je i dalje '95-a.

[matematicar]

dudu kaže:

sve ovo što je prije navedeno stoji, plus činjenica da srbi imaju nekakav paranoični strah od mitskih ustaša. da mi je samo bilo provesti tih par zadnjih sati u kninu kad su čuli da stižu ustaše koja je to panika bila, živi šou

a sta mislis odakle taj strah potice?

[Luftwaffe]

Michael Collins kaže:

Ja nemam pojma što je to "Pad Krajine", ja sam jedino čuo za OSLOBOĐENJE Knina i Hrvatskih okupiranih prostora

Idiotska tema ... idiot pokretač teme ...

[HR123]

petarjak kaže:

LINK


Ovo nakraju sve ima veze i sa Kosovom

Da li vi stvarno mislite da JNA koja je posedovala rakete zemlja-zemlja 9M21F Luna-M koje ostavljaju krater minimum 800m mogla da izgubi od sacice Slovenaca,nenaoruzanih Hrvata i Muslimana?Pa naravno da nije sve su se Slobo i Franjo dogovorili.

http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=g9pn-...elated&search=

Luftwaffe kaže:

Idiotska tema ... idiot pokretač teme ...

Bez uvreda, drzimo se teme.

[posmatrač]

Krater od 800m .... kad ne prosu kafu po tastaturi jebo te

Kad to pogledam tako onda pola mog grada ne bi uopće postojalo sada od tih luna što prave krater od 800m .... 4 komada luna su ispaljena pa ti sad sračunaj kvadraturu 4 kratera ... ma šta pola čitav grad bi bio otpuhan.

dudu kaže:

da mi je samo bilo provesti tih par zadnjih sati u kninu kad su čuli da stižu ustaše koja je to panika bila, živi šou

Dovoljno je bilo slušati radio prijenose radio postaja iz gradova koji su bili pred oslobođenjem i zahvaćeni panikom pa da otprilike stekneš uvid u situaciju koja je vladala tamo.

[Levak]

petarjak kaže:

LINK

HR123 kaže:

http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=g9pn-...elated&search=

Svaka cast.

[Zrinski]

petarjak kaže:

LINK


Ovo nakraju sve ima veze i sa Kosovom

Da li vi stvarno mislite da JNA koja je posedovala rakete zemlja-zemlja 9M21F Luna-M koje ostavljaju krater minimum 800m mogla da izgubi od sacice Slovenaca,nenaoruzanih Hrvata i Muslimana?Pa naravno da nije sve su se Slobo i Franjo dogovorili.

Ovdje bih se samo posluzio onom crnogorskom............

"Boj ne bije svijetlo oruzje nego srce u junaka"

[Osana]

champ kaže:

Još jedna glupa tema, koja bi trebala relativizirati srpske poraze u ratovima koje su pokušavali voditi, a izgubili su sve kad je pred njih stao iole ozbiljniji protivnik..

Na kraju se ta "silna i strašno naoružana JNA" morala povući čak i sa Kosova.. Ako niste mogli obraniti niti sačuvati niti kolevku srpstva, jedanko tako ste ispušili i sve ostalo!

I Bosnu ste 1995. već izgubili na vojnome planu, ali vas je MZ spasila da ne odnesete gaće na štapu u još jednoj traktor-revoluciji..

dobro.
od marichke bitke, do kosovske (ove najnovije) mogu se izbrojati 10ine ratova koje su srbi vodili. dobili/izgubili, nije tema.
a, ne znam kroz istoriju da su hrvati bili ikome ozbiljan protivnik. sem mongolima, kada su odbranili dalmaciju. :-)
bajke na stranu, ugarima ste bili prirepak, popunjavali prve redove kada je trebalo. na staljingradskom ratistu rasejali kosti. to je sva istorija vaseg bojovnistva. neracunajuci 90e. kada su JNA vodili jedan tolimir (tako se zvase hrvat glavnokomandujuci avijacije?), janez, musliman, crnogorac i komunista.
pa kad u vukovarske sokake posalju 300 tenkova, zar je potreban ozbiljan protivnik da se kolona ukopa!?
lagali su vas.
i za vojnicki poraz/pobedu u bosni.
znas zasto niste zauzeli banja luku, a mogli ste se ushetati?

i, da, istorijski poduhvat moje prababe koja je grabuljama izbila nekog ustashu na ceru.

sve da nas je sram sta smo ucinili. od pashica, kralja alexandra i stvaranja jugoslavije do ndh. ondasnje i danasnje.

Hristos vaskrse!

danas u srbiji, sutra u krajini!

[Ber]

Osana kaže:

dobro.
od marichke bitke, do kosovske (ove najnovije) mogu se izbrojati 10ine ratova koje su srbi vodili. dobili/izgubili, nije tema.
a, ne znam kroz istoriju da su hrvati bili ikome ozbiljan protivnik. sem mongolima, kada su odbranili dalmaciju. :-)
bajke na stranu, ugarima ste bili prirepak, popunjavali prve redove kada je trebalo. na staljingradskom ratistu rasejali kosti. to je sva istorija vaseg bojovnistva. neracunajuci 90e. kada su JNA vodili jedan tolimir (tako se zvase hrvat glavnokomandujuci avijacije?), janez, musliman, crnogorac i komunista.
pa kad u vukovarske sokake posalju 300 tenkova, zar je potreban ozbiljan protivnik da se kolona ukopa!?
lagali su vas.
i za vojnicki poraz/pobedu u bosni.
znas zasto niste zauzeli banja luku, a mogli ste se ushetati?

i, da, istorijski poduhvat moje prababe koja je grabuljama izbila nekog ustashu na ceru.

sve da nas je sram sta smo ucinili. od pashica, kralja alexandra i stvaranja jugoslavije do ndh. ondasnje i danasnje.

Hristos vaskrse!

danas u srbiji, sutra u krajini!

Da, koje su to Srbi vodili ratove od Maričke do ove. U to ubrajaš i četiri kmetovska ustanka u 400 godina ?
Hrvatima u ratovima niste ni do koljena. Možemo usporedbu.

[tiha voda]

Pazi kad Srbin govori o junastvu.

Jadnik ubjedjuje sam sebe, pa mu ne ide, nikako.

Zamislite samo koja je to kolicina iskompleksiranosti, jala, ljubomore, bijesa, kada moras dokazati da su svi tvoji porazi zapravo pobjede, a sve hrvatske pobjede samo predaja, prodaja, djelo Vuka Brankovica ili jednostavno cista izmisljotina.

Jadnici su pokusali sami sebe ubijediti i da su Jelacic i Nikola Subic Madjari.

Prestrasno.

[Osana]

Ber kaže:

Da, koje su to Srbi vodili ratove od Maričke do ove. U to ubrajaš i četiri kmetovska ustanka u 400 godina ?
Hrvatima u ratovima niste ni do koljena. Možemo usporedbu.

neozbiljno.
verovatno da eskimi imaju bogatiju istoriju od hrvata.
svagda bili paori.
naspram nemanjicke srbije.

no, raspravi je kraj.
ne bih da me svedes na svoj nivo.
i u gluposti/neznanju potuces.

[Osana]

tiha voda kaže:

Pazi kad Srbin govori o junastvu.

Jadnik ubjedjuje sam sebe, pa mu ne ide, nikako.

Zamislite samo koja je to kolicina iskompleksiranosti, jala, ljubomore, bijesa, kada moras dokazati da su svi tvoji porazi zapravo pobjede, a sve hrvatske pobjede samo predaja, prodaja, djelo Vuka Brankovica ili jednostavno cista izmisljotina.

Jadnici su pokusali sami sebe ubijediti i da su Jelacic i Nikola Subic Madjari.

Prestrasno.

kakav klishe.
shubic i jelacic.
paradigma hrvatske istorije.
fali jos franjo asishki, pa su sve sinjske gospe na broju.
mladen, pavle shubic... ponos hrvatske.
seoski karakter.
chetovodje.
harambashe.

[4,05%]

Bojnik kaže:

Jebiga lako ste živjeli dok ste imali nas da vas hranimo,...

Vidim, jedino proizvodnja jaja pokriva domaću potražnju. A i to će se uvoziti nakon što se budu morali modifikovati kavezi po pravilima EU.

[Fare-Sarajevo]

Niđe veze s mozgom

[dudu]

Osana kaže:

kakav klishe.
shubic i jelacic.
paradigma hrvatske istorije.
fali jos franjo asishki, pa su sve sinjske gospe na broju.
mladen, pavle shubic... ponos hrvatske.
seoski karakter.
chetovodje.
harambashe.

ti i pamet ko krava i balet

[...ska]

petarjak kaže:

LINK


Ovo nakraju sve ima veze i sa Kosovom

Da li vi stvarno mislite da JNA koja je posedovala rakete zemlja-zemlja 9M21F Luna-M koje ostavljaju krater minimum 800m mogla da izgubi od sacice Slovenaca,nenaoruzanih Hrvata i Muslimana?Pa naravno da nije sve su se Slobo i Franjo dogovorili.

Nisam znao da su Srbi imali nuklearke... Otkud to, da im nije Tesla ostavio koju u amanet ?

Ko prvi otvori balkansku online psihijatriju bice bogat covjek...

[tiha voda]

Osana kaže:

kakav klishe.
shubic i jelacic.
paradigma hrvatske istorije.
fali jos franjo asishki, pa su sve sinjske gospe na broju.
mladen, pavle shubic... ponos hrvatske.
seoski karakter.
chetovodje.
harambashe.

Da si samo malo obrazovaniji, znao bi da je Nikola Subic Turcima nanio vise stete nego svi Srbi za 500 godina takozvanog otpora i hajducije.

Jedan Hrvat, sa posadom od par tisuca ratnika, pokosi vise Turaka nego svi Srbi zajedno za 500 godina.

Razumljive su vase frustracije.

[dudu]

tiha voda kaže:

Da si samo malo obrazovaniji, znao bi da je Nikola Subic Turcima nanio vise stete nego svi Srbi za 500 godina takozvanog otpora i hajducije.

Jedan Hrvat, sa posadom od par tisuca ratnika, pokosi vise Turaka nego svi Srbi zajedno za 500 godina.

Razumljive su vase frustracije.

srbi su s turcima vodili potpuno irelevantne bitke za koje ni turci ne vode brigu. na području hrvatske su se pak odvijale neke od najznačajnijih bitaka, a vjerojatno i presudna u borbi protiv turaka, nakon koje počinje tursko povlačenje (bitka kod siska 1593.)

[dudu]

izvješće cia-e o vojskama- HV/HVO, Armija Bih i VRS na kraju rata.

Evaluations of the Forces at the End of the War

How had the armies performed during the last battles
in Bosnia's Wild West? All three forces (considering
the HV/HVO as a single military force) had amply
demonstrated their strengths and weaknesses during a
full month of some of the most intense combat of the
war. The Croatian Army had again established its
position as the premier military organization in the
Balkans. The HV's strengths included excellent staff
planning, its employment of professional shock bri-
gades, and the ability to support its elite infantry with
strong artillery fire and air support. The HV had devel-
oped a true combined arms capability in which picked
infantry units backed by armor and artillery could
fight their way through tough defenses and then rap-
idly exploit their breakthrough to the final objective.
These traits made the HV almost impossible to stop.
The weak spots in any HV campaign remained the
Home Defense and reserve formations, most of which
had little offensive punch and were no match for the
majority of VRS units.831

As for the ARBiH, it is true that the HV provided the
main impetus in defeating the VRS, but the Bosnian
Army played a key role in these operations as well.
ARBiH operations throughout the country kept VRS
units tied down and made it difficult to shift reserves
to halt the HV's attacks. General Dudakovic was not
wholly reliant on Croatian attacks to ease the way for
ARBiH advances, even though analysts have argued
that the 5th Corps was able to break out from the Gra-
bez plateau on 13 September only because of a coordi-
nated VRS withdrawal made necessary by the success
of "Maestral." On the contrary, it is clear that the 5th
Corps defeated the 2nd Krajina Corps at Grabez on its
own and that the VRS had no intention of pulling out
of the area and was still holding out in Drvar against
the HV the day of the ARBiH's successful attack. It
was the arrival of the 5th Corps at Petrovac that aided
the HV attack rather than the other way around. The
5th Corps won its unique victory because of the moral
and tactical ascendancy that its elite infantry units had
established over the VRS forces during three years of
hard fighting on the Grabez plateau. Time and again
Dudakovic's forces had demoralized the Serb defend-
ers with sophisticated diversion and infiltration tactics,
and they were no longer able to resist them. What kept
the ARBiH from triumphing over the VRS in other sit-
uations was its persistent weaknesses in heavy weap-
onry, which made it vulnerable to the VRS's strengths
in armor, artillery, and solid staff work. The effects of
this mismatch in capabilities were fully demonstrated
during the late September-early October VRS coun-
terstrikes and exacerbated in the open warfare of the
last campaign. In those battles, ARBiH troops had to
fight offensively, unprotected by fortifications, against
VRS units that did not have the same fear of the
ARBiH infantry that had been impressed upon the 2nd
Krajina Corps troops. The 5th Corps' final capture of
Sanski Most was, in fact, something of a fluke because
the VRS had placed its luckless Grabez units opposite
their most feared opponents.

The ARBiH commanders-particularly Generals
Delic and Dudakovic-firmly believed that they could
have quickly gained substantially more ground from
the VRS around Prijedor and Banja Luka after the vic-
tory of Sanski Most. In this belief they are probably
overrating their capabilities against VRS forces that
had regrouped and regained their footing between
Sanski Most and Prijedor. In most of the VRS-ARBiH
combat following the 15 September 5th Corps break-
out from Bihac, the VRS had held the upper hand.
Even after the ARBiH captured Sanski Most, the VRS
was able to halt the 5th Corps drive on Prijedor. It
therefore seems unlikely that the 5th Corps, even rein-
forced by units from 7th Corps and other formations,
could have beaten the 1st Krajina Corps without the
help of anew HV operation directed at Banja Luka.832

The Bosnian Serb Army, denigrated throughout the
war as armed thugs good only at slaughtering civil-
ians, proved in the last months of its existence that it
could still fight hard against a Croatian Army that
clearly overmatched its military capabilities.833 Analy-
sis of the latter-day war operations refutes many
claims and rumors that the VRS voluntarily withdrew
from its positions in western Bosnia rather than being
forced from the region by the HV /HVO and ARBiH.
In the first place, the VRS had firmly maintained no
withdrawals would be made, even from territory not
required by the Serbs, until after a cease-was signed;
then, if territory had to be given up, the population
could depart in an orderly way.834 In keeping with this
position, the VRS everywhere stood up to the initial
attacks made on it but proved unable to stem the flood
of the Croat-Muslim tide. Against the HV, its fatal
flaw almost predictably proved to be the lack of ade-
quate corps-level reserves to seal breaches in VRS
lines. Generally the VRS appears to have been able to
hold the HV for about a day in its forward defenses
before the HV was able to chew through its positions.
Because it had virtually no reserve brigades in western
Bosnia and because its positions there generally con-
sisted only of a single defensive zone no more than 5
to 10 kilometers deep, the VRS was unable to mount
the counterattacks by which it had maintained these
positions against the ARBiH.1n fighting the HV/
HVO, VRS units were faced for the first time with an
opponent that not only matched but also exceeded
their own firepower in armor and artillery while also
outnumbering them in manpower. Finally, what tipped
the balance, even when the offense/defense ratio
favored the VRS, was the HV/HVO's elite shock
infantry brigades. The VRS could defeat Croatian
reserve units. The well-trained, doggedly persistent
Guards were another matter.

The VRS generals, Mladic and Milovanovic, and the
VRS Main Staff displayed to the end their prowess at
engineering strategic shifts of their limited formations.
The move of seven major formations from halfway
across the country despite heavy damage to its com-
mand and control structure during the NATO air cam-
paign was a triumph of the VRS Main Staff's
professionalism and skill. The Serbs' rapid execution
of major counterattacks also showed how powerful the
VRS remained at the end of the 'war, particularly
against the ARBiH. In his last campaign, however, the
western Bosnia theater commander, General Milo-
vanovic, appears to have made some initial errors in
his force dispositions that cost the VRS dearly. His
forces were split too evenly among the Donji Vakuf,
Glamoc-Drvar, and Grabez sectors, rather than con-
centrated in what the VRS considered a vital sector.
Given that the HV was the main threat, he should have
either concentrated more troops opposite the Glamoc-
Drvar area sooner or sent in his reserves before the
enemy breakthrough. The VRS Main Staff, too, either
did not recognize how brittle the 2nd Krajina Corps
had become or was unable to do anything about it;
General Tomanic's command appears to have been
through the wringer one too many times and collapsed
fatally on the Grabez under yet another 5th Corps
attack. In all, the VRS simply faced too many compet-
ing priorities throughout Bosnia so that the Main Staff
could no longer focus its forces on one theater.

One of the most discussed hypothetical questions of
the final campaign is whether the HV (and/or the
ARBiH) could have taken Banja Luka. The answer is
a heavily qualified "probably," the main qualifier
being timing. An HV dash for Banja Luka soon after
the completion of "Maestral" probably would have got
to the city quickly or forced the VRS to divert all of
the reserves it was sending to Prijedor instead to Banja
Luka, in which case the 5th Corps could have taken
Prijedor. The same holds true for "Juzni Potez" in that,
the more quickly the HV moved, the less time the
VRS would have had to prepare. On the other hand, if
the VRS had been given time to transfer more units
after "Juzni Potez," Banja Luka most likely would
have proved a difficult nut for even the HV to crack. In
the immediate aftermath of Mrkonjic Grad's fall, the
VRS had already shifted the veteran 16th Krajina
Motorized Brigade-probably the best brigade in the
VRS-to Manjaca.83S If the VRS believed an HV oper-
ation against Banja Luka was imminent, the Main
Staff would most likely have transferred all available
reserves to the Manjaca area, building up a force that
could have numbered at least nine and maybe 11 bri-
gades, including a full-armored brigade, with upward
of 15,000 to 20,000) troops.836 The VRS troops would
very likely have fought' even harder for Banja Luka
than the SVK did at Knin, for they would not have
been encircled. Such a large-scale movement of
reserves, however, would have left the VRS vulnera-
ble to attacks elsewhere, particularly around Doboj
and-depending on whether the HV /HVO wanted it-
in the Posavina area opposite Orasje.