Mongolska osvajanja

[žacko1]

Naletjeh na fascinantan poadatak u TV-kalendar ,emisiji, kako su mongolci umalo svojom borbenom taktikom pokorili skoro čitavu evropu,čak su ušli i u pojedine dijelove Hrvatske,molim zna li netko nešto više o tome i kolika je to vojska morala biti da pregazi rusiju?

[-CP-]

Ne znam baš mnogo o toj temi,ali samo da ti kazem da Rusija kao država još nije postojala već je bila Kijevska Rus, koja nema nikakve veze s Rusijom koja će se kasnije razviti iz moskovske kneževine. Mongoli su Kijevsku Rus pregazili u 13. st.

[paradigma_12]

žacko1 kaže:

Naletjeh na fascinantan poadatak u TV-kalendar ,emisiji, kako su mongolci umalo svojom borbenom taktikom pokorili skoro čitavu evropu,čak su ušli i u pojedine dijelove Hrvatske,molim zna li netko nešto više o tome i kolika je to vojska morala biti da pregazi rusiju?

Ima jako puno o tome. Mongoli su imali najvise vojske kad su stigli na
La Manche canal bilo ih je preko 100 000.
Krscanska pretjerivanja kazu cak i oko 200 000, ali tako uvijek pisu pobjedjeni.
Mongola nije bili vise od milijun u to doba. Nema teorije da su skupili toliku vojsku za Europu, a da ne ugroze osvojene teritorije od Pacifika, do atlantika, mediterana. Cak ni sa placenicima pokorenih naroda, nisu mogli u jednom pravcu poslati 200 000, a da ne ugroze ostale linije.
Strasna oluja je unistila sve brodove kojima su htjeli preci u Englesku.
Mongolski saman je to protumacio kao znak bozji i vratili su se u Mongoliju i nastavili osvajati juznu Kinu.
Ima dosta materijala po internetu (scribd, youtube).

Glavno oruzje u izravnoj borbi im je bio luk, mogli su sa preko 100 metara probijati oklop europljana, i mogli su u punom galopu pogadjati covjeka u glavu napreko 80 metara. Pogadjali su covjeka ili konja i preko 200 metara, a ta distanca je tada bila znanstvena fantastika za Europljane.
Tak da su rijetko koristili maceve, jer su strijelci obavili svoje.
Macevi su im bili cvrsci od europskih i bez problema su ih lomili.
Carevinu je uspostavio Temujin khan (Jingis Khan).
Carstvo im se raspalo nakon Kublaj kana, u borbama za prijestolje.

Glavno oruzje opsjedanja gradova su im je bili stakori.
Ako opsjednuti grad nije prihvatio ultimatum,
bacali su katapultima stakore u opkoljeni grad.
Koji su su se nezadrzivo razmnozavali, jeli hranu opsjednutih i sirili su i zarazne bolesti.
Zatim su bacali katapultima lesine uginulih zivotinja u stanju raspadanja u opsjednute gradove.

Za Temujina (Temudzina) tj. Jingis Khana, ukupna vojska je na vrhuncu moci imala preko 180 000 vojnika.
Imao je jednu zenu Borte i jos nekoliko konkubina na terenu. Ali nikada na prijestolju nije drzao konkubine. Konkubine su vise bile politicki savez sa porobljenim narodima, nego stvar sexa. Mnoge nije nikada ni vidio.
Samo Bortina djeca su imala status princeva.

Teritorij koji su osvojili Mongoli, bio je veci od pokojnog Sovjetskog saveza.
Prodrli su cak i u Afriku.

Jedan linija raspada mongolskog carstva su Moguli od Indije, koju je takodjer osvojio.

Carstvo Timur Lenke je isto nastalo raspadom mongolskog carstva.

Porobili su skoro cijelu Kinu. Razbili Ruse skroz, Grcku (Bizantiju).

[paradigma_12]

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Genghis_Khan
.
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Mongol_Empire
.
http://www.allempires.com/article/in..._Mongol_Empire




http://www.lacma.org/khan/images/mongolmap.jpg

[paradigma_12]

Mongol Empire
biggest land empire in history
1279 - 1368
http://franklaughter.tripod.com/cgi-...sc/mongol.html

[jax]

[von_ungern]

FAIL

[von_ungern]

ono gore je zajebancija, jel?

[haram]

... evo jedan stariji ali dobar dokumenjarac na jubitu :
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=OiLTX_2-560

... i ovaj igrano-dokumentarni o zivotu Genghis Khana nije los :
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=sXt0KBNdKtA

[Gilles de Rais.]

von_ungern kaže:

ono gore je zajebancija, jel?

Koje? Ono paradigmino? Uzevsi u obzir njegove prijasnje postove, nazalost, bojim se da je ozbiljan. Napisacu kratku ispravku njegovih "tvrdnji", jer bi neko naivan i neupucen mogao i da mu povjeruje.

paradigma_12 kaže:

Mongoli su imali najvise vojske kad su stigli na
La Manche canal bilo ih je preko 100 000.

Ako pogledas mapu koju si sam postavio, primijetices da su se oni zaustavili u Poljskoj i Madjarskoj i da se nikada nisu ni priblizili engleskom kanalu. Takodje, moderna istrazivanja su pokazala da mongolska vojska koja se borila u Evropi nije imala vise od 40-50 000 vojnika, jer bi veci broj ljudi i konja (a znamo da je svaki mongolski ratnik obavezno sa sobom vodio minimalno po 5 konja) predstavljao izazov koji tadasnja logistika ne bi mogla rijesiti. Lijepo je vidjeti da ljudi i dalje vjeruju u abnormalno velike okrugle brojeve i da nimalo ne preispituju njihovu vjerodostojnost.

paradigma_12 kaže:

Strasna oluja je unistila sve brodove kojima su htjeli preci u Englesku.

Vjerovatno su to bile engleske kamikaze...

paradigma_12 kaže:

Mongolski saman je to protumacio kao znak bozji i vratili su se u Mongoliju i nastavili osvajati juznu Kinu.

Ne, prekinuli su sa operacijama u Evropi jer je mongolski vladar Ogedei kan umro, te se Batu kan sa njegovom vojskom vratio u domovinu kako bi trazio svoja prava na prijesto.

paradigma_12 kaže:

Ima dosta materijala po internetu (scribd, youtube).

paradigma_12 kaže:

Glavno oruzje opsjedanja gradova su im je bili stakori.
Ako opsjednuti grad nije prihvatio ultimatum,
bacali su katapultima stakore u opkoljeni grad.
Koji su su se nezadrzivo razmnozavali, jeli hranu opsjednutih i sirili su i zarazne bolesti.
Zatim su bacali katapultima lesine uginulih zivotinja u stanju raspadanja u opsjednute gradove.

A sta cemo sa svim onim kineskim inzinjerima i opsadnim strucnjacima koje su Mongoli uposljavali u svojoj vojsci, njihovoj artiljeriji (za koju napredni Evropljani tada nisu ni culi), masovnom koristenju primitivnih eksplozivnih naprava i ostalom? Evo par ilustracija koje prikazuju mongolske opsadne tehnike, reci mi koliko pacova je prikazano na njima, a koliko opsadnih masina?

paradigma_12 kaže:

Prodrli su cak i u Afriku.

Nisu. Zaustavili su ih egipatski mameluci u bitci kod Ain al-Jaluta. Sto se moze vidjeti i na tvojoj mapi.

paradigma_12 kaže:

Porobili su skoro cijelu Kinu. Razbili Grcku (Bizantiju).

Ne, naprotiv. Vizantija je sklopila savez sa Mongolima 1263, jer je vizantijski car dao svoje kcerke mongolskim kanovima za zene, a oni su mu zauzvrat slali njihove ratnike kao pomoc u sukobima u kojima je Vizantija ucestvovala.

paradigma_12 kaže:

Gilles, potvrdjujes pravilo koje kaze, kako fanatik nikad ne vidi u sebi fanatika.
Strucan si i logican ko Semir od Piramide. Uzdravlje i uzivaj.

[Dilberth]

Paradigma je dao kratak i dobar opis Mongola i mongolskog nacina ratovanja. Jeste da je malo pobrkao Engleze sa Japancima, ali to nije tako strasno.
Nisam siguran o onom o stakorima, jer bi ih to sprijecilo da i sami udju kasnije u grad, ali su upotrbljavali mnogobrojne smicalice psihickog rata. Na pr. govorili su praznovjernim muslimanima i krscanima da ih je Bog poslao da ih kazne i sl.
Bili su odlicni takticari u borbi i znali su kako da manevriraju sa svojom konjicom. Na kraju bi obicno opkolili tesko naoruzane oklopljene europske vitezove i strijelama pobili konje pod njima. Konac bitke nije tesko predvidjeti.

Nije ih bilo tako mnogo, ali su imali talenta da organiziraju i motiviraju druge narode da se bore za njih. Oni su doveli sa sobom Tatare u Rusiju i na Krim. Kasnije su se vecina Mongola vratila, ali su Tatari ostali da dave Ruse stotinama godina nakon mongolskih pohoda.

Mongoli koji su ostali u Rusiji, u kraju sjeverno od Kaspijskog jezera, Rusi zovu Kalmici. Njihov najznacajniji sin je veliki revolucionar i polu-bog, Lenjin.

[demon]

Mongolsli upad u Europu po Batu-om je bio više "izviđačkog karaktera". Upao je a vojskom potaracao domaće u par bitaka, poharao teritorij šireći strah i trepet... u drugom naletu bi došao sa još većom vojskom i vjerovatno sa ultimatumom da mu se pokore inače će biti još gori nego prvi put...

Što se tiče Ain Jaluta, tu su Mameluci potaracali pomoćnu mongolsku vojsku, nije bio to bogzna kakav poraz za Mongole glede gubitaka, ali je zato Arapima dao krila. Pokazalo se da se mogu sa Mongolima uspješno nositi i otad se klatno počelo vraćati nazad u njihovu korist. Dotad je Mongole pratila fama nepobjedivosti.

Mongolske vojske koje su pokorilie europsku Rusiju i bliski Istok su bile u prvom redu popunjene Turcima, a potom i vazalnim narodima, recimo na bliskom istoku su to bili Gruzijci i Armenci koji su se iskazali u uništenju Bagdada"...

Timur, posljednji veliki "mongolski" osvajač, je bio Turčin. Kanati koji su nastali raspadom Zlatne horde su bili turske države.

[paradigma_12]

Gilles de Rais. kaže:

Ne, naprotiv. Vizantija je sklopila savez sa Mongolima 1263, jer je vizantijski car dao svoje kcerke mongolskim kanovima za zene, a oni su mu zauzvrat slali njihove ratnike kao pomoc u sukobima u kojima je Vizantija ucestvovala.

Against Byzantine Thrace (1265)
During the reign of Berke there was also a raid against Thrace. In the winter of 1265 Nogai Khan led a Mongol raid of two tumens (20,000 soldiers) against the territories of Bulgaria and Byzantine Eastern Thrace. In the spring of 1265 he defeated the armies of Michael VIII Palaeologus. Instead of fighting, most of the Byzantines fled due to powerful Mongol army. After this Thrace was plundered by Nogai's army, and the Byzantine emperor made an alliance with the Golden Horde, giving his daughter Euphrosyne in marriage to Nogai. And also Michael had sent much if valuable fabrics to Golden Horde as tributary since then.

[paradigma_12]

Mongol Conquests


http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Mongol_invasions

[paradigma_12]

Era of the Mongols [ca. 1200-1350]

http://www.h-net.org/~fisher/hst373/...y/mongols.html

[žacko1]

Paradigma@ zahvaljujem na konciznu opisu,nego možeš li navesti još njihovih oružja za napad na zidine,...veliš injžinjere imali za konstrukcije,pa otkud im u pustinji toliko kamenja za napad,pa otkuda im ti štakori mnogobrojni za ubaciti u grad? Nisu li ih valjda furali sa sobom?
Hajde ,malko dočaraj više od napisana,molim.
Hvala.

[paradigma_12]

Military History and Warfare: The Mongol Invasion of Europe: the battles of Liegnitz and the Sajo River

In the late 1230s Mongolian forces began a series of invasions which extended their empire to the frontiers of Christendom. In December 1237, an army led by Genghis Khan’s grandson Batu Khan attacked the city of Rizan, storming it after only a five-day siege. Having subdued much of western Russia by 1241, Batu Khan prepared a three-pronged attack against Poland, Hungary and Romania.

By the mid-thirteenth century the Mongol Empire covered a landmass stretching from China to the outskirts of Poland. Mongol military success had been a combination of mobility, tactics and the high quality of the Mongol warrior and mount. Mongol armies were based around a core group of light and heavy cavalry organised on the decimal system. The largest tactical formation was the ‘tuman’ consisting of 10,000 warriors. Three tumans usually constituted a Mongol army. The tuman was made up of ten regiments (‘minghans’) of 1,000 men. Each regiment contained ten squadrons ‘jagun’. The jagun was subdivided into ten troops called arbans. In comparison to western forces available at this time, the Mongol army was an extremely well organised fighting force. By dividing the army into smaller units, the Mongols gained tactical flexibility which allowed them to take full advantage of the speed of their horses, inflict devastating attacks and then disappear quickly into the grasslands. Time and time again, the Mongol system of warfare proved itself superior to that of its opponents.

The typical Mongol army was largely cavalry based, consisting of about 60 percent light cavalry and 40 percent heavy cavalry. Both units were crucial to Mongol strategy. Mongol light cavalry performed reconnaissance roles and acted as a screen for the heavy cavalry. These light horseman were armed with two composite bows, (one for long distance, the other for short), two or three javelins and a lasso. The heavy cavalry were equipped with a 12ft lance along with sabre for hand to hand combat.

It was this highly organised fighting force that prepared to conquer Europe in 1241. In Poland, the northern army under Batu’s lieutenants Baider and Kedan sacked and burned Krakow on Palm Sunday 1241. Ignoring Breslau, they converged on Liegtnitz, where Henry, duke of Silesia had assembled an impressive force to bar the way into the Holy Roman Empire. Henry’s forces consisted of military order contingents of Teutonic, Templar and Hospitaler knights. They were supported by Polish and German lay knights and thousands of infantry.


When the Mongols approached Henry’s forces at Liegnitz on the morning of the 9th April 1241 with a screen of light cavalry. Henry ordered his heavy cavalry to charge, only to have it beaten back by successive waves of Mongol arrows. Henry pushed forward the attack and ordered all his remaining cavalry forward. However, this time the Mongol light cavalry turned and took flight. The Europeans pursed them only to find that the Mongols had wheeled their far more agile horses round and resumed their arrow bombardment. The Christian knights lost their cohesion and began to be picked off by Mongol archery. In the meantime, other Mongol troops had started a fire, setting up a smoke screen between Henry’s infantry and the now-trapped cavalry. The Mongol heavy cavalry and horse archers emerged from the smoke and completely routed Henry’s infantry. Henry himself was killed trying to flee the battlefield.

After the battle, the Mongols cut off an ear from every fallen Christian warrior to make an accurate body count. Nine bags of ears were eventually sent to Batu as tribute.

Whilst the northern Mongol force pillaged Poland, Batu Khan’s central army moved across the Carpathian Mountains and into the Hungarian plain. The Hungarian king Bela IV had prepared for the invasion by collecting a huge army (by medieval standards) of 80,000 men. On the morning of the 10th April, the Mongols rode over the heath and crossed the only stone bridge over the Sajo River. The next day, Bela’s forces arrived and searched through the woods for signs of the Mongolian army. Finding nothing, they returned to guard the bridge whilst the remainder of the Hungarian army made its camp on the heath to the rear. During the night, Batu ordered Subutai to take 30,000 cavalry through the hills and quickly construct a wooden bridge across the Sajo beyond the sight of Bela’s forces. Batu intended to engage the Hungarian front, whilst Subutai secretly moved into position and attacked in the rear.

The battle itself began just before dawn on the 11th April when Batu ordered cavalry attacks against the stone bridge held by Bela’s men. The bottleneck of the bridge gave the Hungarians the strategic advantage and the Mongols were unable to break through. It was at that crucial moment that the Mongol flair for military innovation revealed itself. Batu solved the problem by bringing up seven light catapults and bombarded the far side of the bridge with incendiaries and grenades. Confused and stunned by the tactical use of artillery, the Hungarian forces panicked and withdrew from the bridge. Batu then used the catapults to lay down a form of ‘rolling barrage’ to screen his troops as they crossed the bridge. In desperation, Bela launched wave after wave of his heavy cavalry in a concerted attempt to break through the Mongol lines.

Just as it appeared that the Hungarians might succeed, Batu ordered his troops to stretch out into a half circle as if to surround the Christian troops. Suddenly Subotai arrived on the battlefield with his 30,000 fresh cavalry in a matching half-circle behind the defenders. Hungarian morale plummeted as they found themselves trapped on all sides. Those that managed to flee the battlefield were cut down by Mongol cavalry as they ran. By the evening, Christian dead littered thirty miles of road leading out of the battlefield. Conservative estimates place the number of Hungarian dead at 60,000.

Both the battles of Liegnitz and Sajo River illustrated the Mongol use of combined arms tactics, along with stealth, speed and surprise. Mongol discipline and the ability of commanders to manoeuvre large units during an engagement, contrasted deeply with the highly individualistic mode of warfare practised by western knights.

Over the months that followed the Mongols ravaged most of the lowland parts of the Hungary, reaching as far as the Dalmatian coast. The probable population loss has been estimated at 15-20%. Had the Mongols pressed on westwards beyond Hungary and Poland, it is unlikely that they would have encountered co-ordinated opposition. Contemporary annalists report panic as far away as Spain and the Netherlands. Given the relative ease with which the Mongols had smashed their way into Europe, it was almost miraculous that they did not continue their campaign of conquest into the rest of Europe.

There are of course possible explanations for the Mongol retreat. In December 1241 the Great Khan Ogodai died, prompting a succession crisis in the Mongol empire. By the summer of 1242, Mongol forces had withdrawn from Poland and Hungary. Batu’s attention now shifted eastwards to enable him to keep a watchful eye should one of his enemies be elected qaghan (Khan) of the Mongols. There were also sound logistical reasons for withdrawal. Mongol armies required a great deal of land for their large numbers of horses to graze upon. The Dalmatian coastlands were ill-adapted to Mongol cavalry operations. The chronicler Thomas of Spalato confirms this by expressly mentioning that the Mongol general Quadan took with him only a fraction of his contingent in view of the fact that the region afforded little grass in early March. Logistically, the Hungarian plain would have been inadequate to sustain the large occupying Mongol armies. They accordingly pulled back to the more spacious grasslands of the Pontic steppe.

Although the Mongols returned several times over the years that followed, Europe was largely spared the fate of Central Asia. Nevertheless, it is clear from the battles of Liegnitz and Sajo River that the Mongols possessed one of the finest fighting forces in the history of the world. It was therefore very fortunate for Christendom that the Mongols never again came so close to annihilating medieval Europe.


Brian Todd Carey, Joshua B Allfree, John Cairns Warfare in the Medieval World (Barnsley, 2007)

Malcolm Barber, The Two Cities: Medieval Europe 1050-1320 (London, 2007)

Peter Jackson, The Mongols and the West (Edinburgh, 2005)

Timothy May, The Mongol Art of War (Barnsley, 2007)

John H. Mundy, The High Middle Ages 1150-1309 (London 1998

[paradigma_12]

Mongol Arms


Until the modern era, no military force could compete with that of the Mongols in terms of effectiveness and certainly mobility. Through the use of a well disciplined and trained army, that focused on mobility and careful planning, the Mongols carved out the largest contiguous empire in history. Often their armies fought on several fronts at once, a difficult enough task in modern history and practically unheard of during the medieval period.

Training

All males between the ages of 15 to around 60 who were capable of bearing arms were eligible for military service. The rigors of daily living in the harsh climate of Mongolia prepared the nomads well in terms of endurance and fortitude. Trained from youth to be expert horsemen and archers, the nomads of Mongolia were well prepared to be warriors. By the thirteenth century, nomad horse archer armies already possessed a long history of success. Yet, the one which Chinggis Khan created perfected this form. He added the essential element that separated the Mongols from their peers: discipline. This enabled him to overcome the assortment of tribal confederations and alliances, which he faced before becoming the ruler of all Mongolia. While other armies would disintegrate in order to loot the dead and baggage of an enemy in flight, Chinggis Khan ordered his armies to wait until victory was complete. Those who disobeyed this command would be struck down. This disciplined soldier was then given a high rate of mobility. Each trooper had a string of three to five horses. This allowed him to exchange mounts when one tired. If one was slain, the Mongol trooper had replacements. In sedentary armies, this simply was not possible. Horses were simply too expensive to maintain to allow each cavalryman to have more than one, especially the large horses necessary to carry an armored warrior.

Equipment

The Mongols themselves, in order to maintain their mobility, were lightly armored compared to many of the armies they faced. Their armor, for the most part, consisted of lacquered or boiled leather, which mainly covered the upper body. A helmet was also part of their accoutrement. Other types of armor, such as chain mail, did appear, but it was not as widespread among the Mongols due to the weight. The armament of the Mongols focused on the bow. This was a double recurve composite bow, made of layers of sinew, horn, and wood. Each warrior had more than one, probably attached, in a special quiver, to their saddles on each horse in addition to quivers of arrows. The bow itself possessed an incredible amount of penetrating power, often consisting of pull weights of over one hundred pounds. The Mongols used a wide variety of arrows, many with specialized purposes, such as armor piercing, blunt stun arrows, and even whistling arrows for signaling purposes. In addition, the soldiers carried sabres, maces, axes, and sometimes a short spear with a hook at the bottom of the blade. Other supplies, such as rope, rations, files for sharpening arrows, etc., were also carried. This made the soldiers of the Mongol army a self-sufficient unit able to function independently of supply lines. Thus, they were not hampered by a slow moving baggage train, allowing them to make the rapid marches that so characterized Mongol warfare.

Organization

The organization of the Mongol army was also an old tradition of the steppe: the decimal system. The army was built upon a squad of ten (arban). Ten of these would then compose a company of a hundred (jaghun ). The next unit was a regiment of a thousand (mingghan). Most of the commanders listed in the contemporary sources were leaders of a mingghan. The equivalent of the modem division was a unit consisting of ten thousand (tumen).

The organization was simple, but sensible. The system could also easily be applied to new conscripts from vassals, or even forcibly conscripted troops from among the conquered. Yet, it is one thing to have organized units, but quite another to have them operate with any amount of efficiency. This is why the discipline of the Mongol army was such a key factor. The tactics that the Mongol army used, such a caracole technique in which the soldiers advanced, shot, then wheeled back in order for the next rank to fire, demanded unit integrity. Unit integrity was achieved through the battue, or hunt. During the battue, the army would form lines which often stretched for miles. These ranks would then begin to envelope an area, forcing the game into the ring. The Mongols would then tighten their ranks, so that the circle continued to shrink. The objective of this was not to allow any animal to escape. An incredibly high degree of organization, communication, and cooperation was necessary for this task. Without it, points of rendezvous could not be established, gaps would eventually appear in the ranks, and inevitably, confusion would result. Only a disciplined army, with a high degree of unit integrity and command structure could accomplish this task.

Strategy and Tactics

Before invading a territory, the Mongols made extensive preparations in a quriltai. At this meeting it was decided not only how the upcoming war would be conducted, but also, which generals would participate in it. In The Secret History of the Mongols, this procedure is demonstrated on several occasions. The Mongols meanwhile would have been accumulating intelligence on their opponent. Only after this was obtained, would there be a declaration of hostilities. Then, during the quriltai, units would be called up. Although the planning of the campaign was a major component, the Mongol generals still maintained a high degree of independence. Thus, they were able to complete their objectives on their terms, but they still had to abide by the timetable. This allowed the Mongols to coordinate their movements and concentrate their forces at prearranged sites.

The Mongols had a set method of invasion which varied only slightly from campaign to campaign. First the Mongol army would invade in several columns. Often it was three pronged attack, consisting of an army of the center and then two flanking forces. Flanking forces in some cases went into neighboring territories before rendezvousing with the army of the center. All of these columns were covered by a screen of scouts who constantly relayed information back to their mother column. In addition, because of their pre-planned schedule as well as the scouts, the Mongols not only marched divided, but also were also able to fight united. Furthermore, because of their forces marched in smaller concentrations, the Mongols were not impeded with columns stretching for miles. They used their mobility to spread terror to the effect that rarely were their opponents ever really prepared to concentrate their forces when the enemy appeared everywhere.

The use of a many-pronged invasion also fit into their preferred method of engaging the enemy. The Mongols preferred to deal with all field armies before moving deep into enemy territory. This was very practical. Reaching this goal was rarely difficult, as the enemy (except in the case of the Khwarazmians) usually sought to meet the Mongols before they destroyed an entire province. Furthermore, the use of columns with its screen of scouts gathering intelligence enabled the Mongols to locate the enemy armies much more rapidly than one army wandering around. In addition, since the Mongols could usually unite their forces before the enemy was cognizant of all of the different invasion forces, the Mongols were better able to conceal their troop strengths. This also meant that an embattled force could receive reinforcements or, in the advent of defeat, they could be avenged.

By concentrating on the field armies, the strongholds had to wait. Of course, smaller fortresses, or ones easily surprised, were taken as they came along. This had two effects. First, it cut off the principle city from communicating with other cities where they might expect aid. Secondly, refugees from these smaller cities would flee to the last stronghold. The reports from these cities and the streaming hordes of refugees not only reduced the moral of the inhabitants and garrison of the principle city, it also strained their resources. Food and water reserves were taxed by the sudden influx of refugees. Soon, what was once a formidable undertaking became easy.

The Mongols were then free to lay siege without interference of the field army as it had been destroyed. Smaller forts and cities could not harry the Mongols who either foraged or were out on other various missions during the siege. Most importantly, the many columns and raiding forces, prevented the main cities from being effective in assisting its smaller neighbors before hand as to do so in any strength, would leave it open to attack. Finally, the capture of the outer strongholds and towns, provided the Mongols more siege experience as well as raw materials in the form of labor to either man the siege machines, or to act as a human shield for the Mongols. It was also not uncommon for defeated troops to be recruited into the Mongol army. The most common method of preventing mutiny at a critical moment was to simply divide the new recruits into the already existing units. This preventing them from being a cohesive force, and it helped maintain unit integrity in the already existing formations.

Then came the task of destroying any hopes for an opponent to rally. This was carried out by harrying the enemy leader until they dropped. Chinggis Khan first carried this out in the wars of unification in Mongolia. In his first few encounters, he did not do this and it returned to haunt him. After that, it becomes a familiar tale. In Khwarazm, it was the flight of Muhammad to the Caspian Sea with Jebe and Subedei in pursuit. In the south of that empire, Chinggis Khan himself pursued Jelal al-Din to the Indus and later sent more troops after him. Then in Europe, King Bela IV received no breathing room after the disaster at Mohi.

By being constantly on the move, the enemy leader was unable to serve as a rallying point for his armies. They too would have to keep moving to find him. In many reports, the enemy leaders were only a few steps ahead of the Mongols. This also offered an opportunity for the Mongols to acquire new intelligence on other lands, as it was only sensible for the fleeing king to run in the opposite direction of the Mongols. The pursuing forces then could wreak havoc in new territories. Their presence made it advisable for local powers to keep their forces at home rather than going to help their overlord. In many instances, the Mongol, when they encountered a local army, would defeat it while avoiding the strongholds. Again, the method of destroying a field army before laying siege. The most important aspect of these flying columns that went in pursuit, is that they destruction they made as well as the fear they spread, created a buffer between the territory in which they were in and the one in which the main army was subduing.

The tactics used, whether in the field or during a siege, focused on two aspects: firepower and mobility. Military historians often speak of the great success of the English with their longbows at Agincourt or Crecy, but almost a century before Crecy, the Mongols had demonstrated on several occasions the advantages of concentrated firepower over any opponent. Not only did a withering hail of arrows break a charge of armored knights, but it also could pin units to a particular location. During siege operations, the Mongols still relied on concentrated firepower. At the siege of Aleppo, Hulegu used twenty catapults against the Bab al-Iraq alone (Gate of Iraq). In Jûzjânî, there are several episodes in which the Mongols constructed hundreds of siege machines in order to surpass the number, which a defending city possessed. While Jûzjânî surely exaggerated, the improbably high numbers which he used for both the Mongols and the defenders does give one a sense of the large numbers of machines used at a single siege.

Mobility was vital for the Mongols to carry out the caracole technique. By advancing, firing, wheeling, and retreating, the Mongol warriors left themselves open to a possible counterattack. Only due to the unit integrity, and mobility (i.e. number of horses involved) permitted the Mongols to do this technique. Other tactics, such as encircling the enemy as the Mongols did during the battue hunt, could only be achieved with a high degree of mobility. Perhaps of most importance, it allowed the Mongols to withdraw and then reappear unexpectantly. This made it almost impossible for their opponents to accurately report on the movements of the Mongol armies.

Discipline separated the Mongol armies from their contemporaries. Without discipline, the Mongols could not have perfected the system of steppe/horse archer warfare, which had existed for centuries. Nomads since the Scythians and Hsiung-nu based their armies and method of war on mobility and the bow. The Mongols, however, perfected it, allowing them to conquer the entire steppe land of Eurasia. While some may dismiss this accomplishment as simply being a victory over other tribes, one must remember, these are the tribes from which the Khitan, the Jurchen, and the mighty Seljuk armies came. Horse archers from the steppes were a desired element in every sedentary army stretching from China to Egypt. The Mongols perfected the system by adding the strict discipline that allowed them to overcome other nomads who also relied on the key factors of mobility and the bow. After overcoming the nomads of the Eurasian steppes, the victories over sedentary armies seem less astonishing.


Dr. Timothy May
Assistant Professor of History
Young Hall
North Georgia College and State University

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The Origins of the Plague
The Mongols had vast control over the area of China, and it is here that the dreaded Bubonic Plague, or Black Death, originated. The plague soon spread over trade routes, which were, at that time, under Mongol control. Unfortunately for the Mongols, the spread of the plague would also lead to a decline of this trade during the 1350s and 1360s. This had a dire impact on the Mongol Empire, particularly in the regions under the control of the Golden Horde. A vast portion of Mongol income came from commercial endeavors, and the decline of trade meant a decline in revenue which supported Mongol cities and their immense, cavalry-based army. In addition to this loss of commercial foundation, Mongol cities also experienced vast population losses as both common citizens and military leaders succumbed to the fatal disease. The effects of the Black Death combined with other factors, such as civil wars including a large rebellion led by Timerlane, to weaken the Mongol Empire and bring about its decline and eventual collapse.

Impact of the Black Death
While the Black Death was bringing about the decline of the Mongol Empire in the East, its destruction in western Europe had led to a new era of learning and discovery; the Renaissance. Western Europe had previously been spared attack by the Mongols because it had nothing of value that the Mongols could not receive from Eastern Europe. Furthermore, the geography west of Hungary lacked prairie lands and was unsuitable for the pastoral-nomadic Mongols. Thus, during the period following the spread of the Black Death, Western Europe was able to expand in power and influence. This would eventually lead to a permanent shift of world power from Eastern to Western Eurasia.

In analyzing the events of the Mongol Empire and their relation to the Black Death, it becomes clear that the Mongols were in part responsible for the spread of this deadly epidemic. However, the Mongols themselves were not exempt from the adverse effects of this disease. In fact, this disease would play a significant role in the downfall of the greatest land empire in history. Furthermore, Black Death was a leading cause in the rise of Western Europe as a world power; a rise that would not have taken place if the Mongols had not spared this region of Eurasia. Thus, it is clear to the historian that during this era of world history the Mongols of the east intertwined with the events of the West to shape the world into what we know today.

Resources:

Christian, David. A History of Russia, Central Asia, and Mongolia. Malden: Blackwell Publishing, 1998. “History of The Mongols.” HistoryWorld. 10 November 2005.



Read more at Suite101: The Mongols and Plague: Spreading the Black Death http://early-middle-ages.suite101.co...#ixzz0lFEnZ9cV

Read more at Suite101: The Mongols and Plague: Spreading the Black Death http://early-middle-ages.suite101.co...#ixzz0lFEfIybr

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Mongol military tactics and organization

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Mongol_...d_organization