Srbija u Prvom svjetskom ratu

[Zoran Oštrić]

kiseli1 kaže:

Novinar doslovno , kaki .... (…)

Londonskim ugovorom (bez obzira sto nije bila prisutna) Srbija je dobila odredjene teritorije, bez ikakvog ustupka Bugarskoj.

Pa ne kaki, evo pisao sam kako to prikazuje jedan bugarski povjesničar, ne samo wikipedija. Od svibnja do početka rujna 1915. stvarno je postojao jak pritisak sila Antante na Srbiju da pristane na teritorijalne ustupke Bugarskoj.

U prosincu 1915 Srbija je vec bila okupirana, a krajem 1916 godine, Pasic je imao tajne kontakte sa Austro-Ugarskom, o izlasku Srbije iz rata

Pa to je već posve drugačija situacija, od ulaska Bugarske u rat na strani Centralnih sila sve prethodne kombinacije su bespredmetne.

Srbija je odbila dati Bugarskoj ustupke, osim nešto minimalno. S druge strne, koliko sam skužio, Bugari bi vjerojatno svejedno stali na suprutnu stranu.

Nista tajnog, i "novo otkrivenog" nema po tom pitanju

To je, koliko vidim, točno. Mogao bi se ovaj topic valjda promijenti,. proširiti u "Srbija u 1SR" ili sl..

[kiseli1]

Zasto ne bi pogledao knjigu "Britain and the Origins of the New Europe 1914-1918" od Kenneth J. Calder. Drugo poglavlje u knjizi "YUGOSLAVIA IN THE BALKAN NEGOTIATIONS, 1914-15", daje u detalje sta je kome ponudjeno, usmeno (bez obaveze), i pismeno.Takodjer ,pogledaj "The Serbian Campaign of 1915: Its Diplomatic Background" od Gerard E. Silberstein (The American Historical Review Vol. 73, No. 1 (Oct., 1967), pp. 51-69), te "The Russian struggle for power, 1914-1917; a study of Russian foreign policy during the First World War". By: Smith, Clarence Jay. Published: (1956)

[Zoran Oštrić]

kiseli1 kaže:

Zasto ne bi pogledao knjigu "Britain and the Origins of the New Europe 1914-1918" od Kenneth J. Calder. Drugo poglavlje u knjizi "YUGOSLAVIA IN THE BALKAN NEGOTIATIONS, 1914-15", daje u detalje sta je kome ponudjeno, usmeno (bez obaveze), i pismeno.Takodjer ,pogledaj "The Serbian Campaign of 1915: Its Diplomatic Background" od Gerard E. Silberstein (The American Historical Review Vol. 73, No. 1 (Oct., 1967), pp. 51-69), te "The Russian struggle for power, 1914-1917; a study of Russian foreign policy during the First World War". By: Smith, Clarence Jay. Published: (1956)

Pročitao sam poglavlje iz jednje knjige bugarskog autora i gore prenio neke bitne djelove. Kaže, da je zaista postojao pritisak veliki sila Antante na Srbiju, od svibnja do početka rujna 1915., da pristane na teritorijalni ustupak Bugarskoj.

Tvrdi li se u tim knjigama nešto bitno drugačije?

[WarrenYoung]

Zoran Oštrić kaže:

Sve u svemu, koliko vidim, ništa novo nema u ovim bombastičnim objavama u "Nedeljniku" o toj krizi koja je trajala od svibnja do rujna 1915..

Nisam primetio da je došlo do otvaranja nove teme, pa sam ti možda trebao odgovoriti na ovoj.

No, nije bitno sad.

U svakom slučaju, izdanje Nedeljnika se pojavilo baš u trenutku kad je meni Wikiceha "objašnjavao" da se Srbija morala Makedonije odreći 1919 godine zarad proširenja na zapadu.

A prilog u Nedeljniku i stenogrami kojih se dokopao hrvatski novinar pokazuju da se ni 1915 nije morala odreći, odnosno nije pristala da se odrekne Makedonije u trenucima kada se pored AustroUgarske spremala i Nemačka da je napadne, a pretio je i napad Bugarske s ledja u slučaju da se ne prihvati ponuda.

Stenogram sa te sednice ne otkriva ništa novo, ali jeste autentičan i nije prikazan do sada u javnosti.
Kao što si i sam naveo, postoje još neki izvori koji ukazuju da se srpsko rukovodstvo 1915 godine ponaša neracionalno, nerazumno i megalomanski.

Oni pokazuju da Srbi Jugoslaviju vide kao Veliku Srbiju, ne žele da se odreknu Makedonije, a proširenja na sever i zapad ih vredjaju, jer se podrazumevaju. Oni žele i Hrvate i Slovence pod svoju krunu da stave.
Saveznici na to gledaju kao na sumanutu ideju, svejedno da li se država naziva Jugoslavija ili Velika Srbija.

Istorija je pokazala da je Srbima pošlo za rukom da ostvare proklamovane ratne ciljeve, koliko god blesavo i nerealno izgledali 1915 godine.

Moj stav sa druge teme je da je to bila ogromna istorijska greška Srba, te da ako je već plaćena velika cena tvrdoglavosti 1915 godine, onda se 1919 godine trebalo širiti onoliko koliko se moglo progutati i izbegavati konfrontaciju sa Italijanima zbog Hrvatske i Slovenije.

Kraljevina SHS je bila ta Velika Srbija koja se nije mogla progutati i svariti.

Neka proširena Srbija na sever, sa BiH i izlaskom na Jadran preko Kotora i Dubrovnika bi bila daleko stabilnija država, sa manje unutrašnjih problema i spoljnih neprijatelja.

[WarrenYoung]

[Liudewitus]

WarrenYoung kaže:

Neka proširena Srbija na sever, sa BiH i izlaskom na Jadran preko Kotora i Dubrovnika bi bila daleko stabilnija država, sa manje unutrašnjih problema i spoljnih neprijatelja.

Pa ni puno manja se nije pokazala stabilnom. Podsjećam da je i ona "socijalistička" imala jedva 2/3 Srba unutar svojih granica. Hrvatska je u tom pitanju bila daleko "stabilnija".

[zrimo]

Po ovome Srbiji nuđen dio Bosne i Srijem, Dalmacija Talijanima a u ostalim područjima bi se sproveo referendum.
Srbija traži cijelu BiH, Slavoniju, Srijem, Bačku, južnu Dalmaciju ali se ne želi odreći dijelova Makedonije.

Srbi su na kraju ostvarili svoje megalomanske ciljeve, sve bi to i progutali s vremenom da nije bilo drugog naleta Germana i ponovnog preslagivanja karata s WW2.
Kraljevina Jugoslavija je sporazumno razgraničila s Italijom, u to doba više ima unutarnjih neprijatelja nego vanjskih.

[Zoran Oštrić]

WarrenYoung kaže:

Moj stav sa druge teme je da je to bila ogromna istorijska greška Srba, te da ako je već plaćena velika cena tvrdoglavosti 1915 godine, onda se 1919 godine trebalo širiti onoliko koliko se moglo progutati i izbegavati konfrontaciju sa Italijanima zbog Hrvatske i Slovenije.

Kraljevina SHS je bila ta Velika Srbija koja se nije mogla progutati i svariti.

Neka proširena Srbija na sever, sa BiH i izlaskom na Jadran preko Kotora i Dubrovnika bi bila daleko stabilnija država, sa manje unutrašnjih problema i spoljnih neprijatelja.

Ako razlikujemo tri stupnja u bavljenju poviješću: činjenice, intepretacije (tu zapravo povdrazuijevam povezivanje s drugim činjenicama, da se shvati kontekst - a to se može raditi na razne načine, gledati iz raznih perspektiva koje mogu sve imati utemeljenje u stvarnosti) i vrednovanje, kad iznosiš da je to bila "ogromna istorijska greška" (a kako rekoh, slušao sam to i prije 30 godina), to je vrednovanje (naknadna pamet), kao i kad neki Hrvati danas žale, da je pristanak na Jugoslaviju bio povijesna greška.

Postojala jest alternativa da se jednostavno vojno zaposjedne što se može. General Simović, predstavnik Kraljevine Srbije, rekao je to predstavnicima Narodnoga vijeća kad je došao u Zagreb, sredinom studenoga, da je njegov zadatak kao vojnika zaposjesti vojno one teritorije, na koje Srbija polaže pravo.

S druge strane, naveo sam, a i drugi ovdje to ističu, da su onaq područja koja kontrolira Narodno viješe, Slovenija i SZ Hrvatska, puno ekonomski naprednija od Srbije, Bosne i dr.. Izgleda nezamisliovo, da jedan kralj ili predsjednik vlade odbiju priliku da zavladaju tim područjima, kad im se sama nude.

No mene je začudio i drugi tvo jstav, da je ideja dvojne federacije bia također totalno neprihvatljiva i da bi opet bilo bolje to jednostavno odbiti.

Moj je mišljenje da bi razumniji vladar mogao postaviti znatno bolje osnove za tu državu u samom početku. Spomenuo sam da je regent Aleksandar bio odgojen u Rusiji i pokušao slijediti način na koji su vladali Romanovi, ne naučivši ništa iz njihove sudbine. Razumniji vladar je mogao shvatiti, da Hratima mora dati neke ustupke, umjesto da pohapsi njihove političke lidere i šalje žandare da batinaju seljake.

Nije morao pristati baš na federaciju, bio je tada u dovoljno jakoj poziciji, ali neke ustupke je mogao dati.

I danas su Belgija i UK višenacionalne federacije i dobro funkcioniraju, a slično je bilo i sa Čehoslovačkom dugo vremena.

Naravno, vidio sam razne komentare ovih dana o toj temi i na srpskim sajtovima, i ranije se svako malo to spominje. Nakon sto godina neuspjeha, mnogi Srbi i dalje misle da je njihov problem da su previše popustljivi.

[zrimo]

Baš me zanima u čemu vide to popuštanje? U kojim primjerima.
Ili pod tim misle što nisu fizički eliminirali 60% stanovništva te države.

Beograd sasvim sigurno ne bi pristao na nikakvu federaciju ali jednostavnim preuređenjem države i osnivanjem Banovine Hrvatske i Slovenije bi znatno smirili odnose.

[kiseli1]

Britain and the Yugoslav idea 1914-1918
The war which broke out in August 1914 concerned, in its genesis, Serbia’s future as an independent state. If it did not seem obvious to many on the day Austrian armies crossed into Serbia, as it did to Seton-Watson, that a Great Serbian state had at that moment become ‘inevitable’, it is not surprising that the future of Serbia and her Habsburg kinsmen soon became the subject of debate. Within four months Whitehall was having its attention drawn, by both the embryonic Yugoslav Committee and the Serbian Government, to aspirations towards South Slavic national amalgamation. A memorandum submitted by Supilo to the British Government in January 1915 stressed that Serb, Croat and Slovene were ‘three designations for a single ethnic unit’, and that the ‘palliative’ of Slav autonomy under Habsburg rule could prove no lasting remedy. The Serbian Government, Sir Charles des Graz reported from Belgrade in April, harboured similar aspirations, and had sent emissaries to the Allied capitals to propagate its view. In May a Yugoslav Committee manifesto (co-authored by Seton-Watson) was delivered to Parliament and published in the press. It stressed the unity and indivisibility of the Yugoslav nation, ‘alike by identity of language, by the unanswerable laws of geography and by national consciousness’, and that nation’s determination to unite its territories in a single independent state.
Those who lobbied the British Government to approve the principle of a united Yugoslav state, furthermore, were never so unrealistic as to bank on the idealistic appeal of national liberation and unification. Repeatedly they emphasised the role a large state might play in obstructing Germany’s route to the Near East. ‘Serbia is not fighting only for Serbia’, proclaimed Bishop Velimirovic, ‘but at the same time for India and Egypt’; the South Slavs were Britain’s ‘unique friend between Hamburg and Baghdad’. To fail to create a South Slav state with its fullest ethnic borders, Seton-Watson urged Whitehall early in 1915, was to ‘renounce the creation of a really effective barrier to German expansion in the Balkans and the “Drang nach Osten”, Independent Serb or Croat states would inevitably be sucked into the German orbit.
Officials were certainly susceptible to such arguments. When one referred in August 1915 to the ‘really large Serbia, which I am convinced it is our interest to encourage’, he implied at least a significant encroachment on Austrian territory. Prior to the war the Monarchy, for all its weaknesses, had seemed a strategic necessity. (‘Great Britain has everything to gain from a strong Austria-Hungary’, Eyre Crowe had written in 1909, ‘on condition that [she] is not dominated by Germany and does not oppress Italy’). But the war had cast German aspirations in a more voracious light and gravely undermined faith in Habsburg independence of Berlin. Ideally, many still felt, a strong Austria would act both as a barrier to German ambition and as a counterpoise to Russia. A federal Monarchy might, it was hoped, fulfil the role of bulwark between Teuton and Slav. But some officials certainly agreed with Namier that Austria must always be ‘the backbone of German imperialism in Europe’, her continued existence ‘a definite victory for Germany’.
Regarding a full, independent South Slav union, however, there was no question of commitments at this stage. British representatives were happy to make positive noises. Supilo recalled that both Grey and Asquith had promised to back a settlement ‘according to the principle of Nationality’. In July Lord Crewe, accepting an amended Yugoslav Committee manifesto, promised the English people’s warm sympathy for the principle of nationality and ‘goodwill’ towards Yugoslav aims ‘after the victorious conclusion of the war’. But in private George Clerk (sympathetic to the Yugoslav cause and Seton-Wats on’s closest Foreign Office ally) cautioned that ‘the time is not yet come for a detailed consideration of these questions — we have still to beat Germany’.
This caution proved misguided, however, as Whitehall was plunged immediately into just such detailed consideration, not by ideological sympathy for the Yugoslav cause or long-term strategic analysis, but by the more pressing exigencies of the war. Already in early 1915 the question of an expanded South Slav state was raised by the military imperative to secure new allies in southern Europe. By that summer, with the war going badly, this need was increasingly critical. The two countries of most interest — Italy and Bulgaria — lay at opposite ends of Yugoslav territory, and it was in both cases with parts of this territory that diplomats hoped to induce allegiance to the Allied cause. The extent to which any principle of ethnic integrity was subservient at this stage to military necessity is shown by the fact that, while ‘nationality’ was disingenuously invoked in one case, in the other it was consciously violated.
British attempts to tie Bulgaria into the anti-German alliance, or at least to secure her neutrality, were ill-fated. But for some time it seemed she might be tempted by Macedonian territories allotted to Serbia in 1913. The national identity of the population concerned had, as we have seen, been thought inchoate. Once it suited Britain to propose a transfer to Bulgaria, however, the justice of the Bulgarian claim seemed more apparent. A sententious memorandum by Lord Eustace Percy considered Serbian concessions necessary to the reconstitution of a Balkan bloc, the ‘only worthy object of Balkan statesmanship’. And while hitherto the Government had, with ‘patience and forbearance’, refrained from pressing the point, a public newly alive to the cause of nationality expected no less:
The unanimous opinion of students in this country [...] is one favourable to the occupation of Macedonia by Bulgaria on the ground of the national principle itself. There is in this country no doubt whatever that the principle of nationalities assigns these regions to Bulgaria, and that, without the cession of these territories, no peace in the Balkans can be assured.
Fortunately, the difficulty of asking an ally fighting for survival to cede territory to a rival who had remained on the fence seemed softened by the scope for compensation in the west. The fact that certain Habsburg lands were claimed as rightful Serbian territory, and that there was sympathy in Britain for the claim, meant this too could be ascribed to principle rather than realpolitik. To British strategists, whose calculations underestimated Serb passions over the recently-acquired territories in Macedonia, this was an admirably holistic solution, promising long-term Balkan rapprochement and a united front against the Central Powers in South-East Europe. The British public believed, a Foreign Office memorandum argued, ‘that a certain injustice was done to Bulgaria in the settlement of the Macedonian question in 1913’, that Britain was partly culpable, that this failure should be redressed, and that in return Serbia should receive ‘all, and far more than all, that she dreamt of in 1912 on the Adriatic and in the Slav lands of Austria-Hungary’. The satisfaction of Serbia in the west and of Bulgaria in Macedonia formed ‘interdependent parts of one policy’.
But despite the lofty justifications, this was plainly wartime diplomacy as usual. The nub of the matter, as Grey expressed it, was that for Bulgaria to be secured without alienating Serbia, Pasic must be given ‘a definite guarantee of the territories which Serbia will receive as the result of a victorious war’. Here, Clerk observed, lay both ‘Serbia’s real avenue to progress and the justification for the cession to Bulgaria which can alone secure us united Balkan support’. Allied victory, Grey promised in May 1915, would ‘secure for Serbia at least the liberation of the whole of Bosnia and Hercegovina and their union with Serbia, and wide access to the Adriatic in Dalmatia’. The enlarged state envisaged by British policy at this stage was not, therefore, ‘Yugoslavia’ — the political union of all South Slavs — but simply an expanded Serbia. Bosnia, Hercegovina and southern Dalmatia (a strip stretching north to the Neretva delta and therefore incorporating Dubrovnik) were reckoned, as we have seen, Serb territories. No form of popular consultation was suggested.
With regard to Croatia proper, Whitehall was more circumspect. Officials were not opposed to the broader Yugoslav idea, and they were anxious to persuade Serbia to make concessions in Macedonia. But they were also acutely sensitive to the views of their allies. And while France was rightly presumed to favour Serbian aggrandisement, it seemed uncertain how Russia, or subsequently Italy, might react. The tendency in pre-war Russia, particularly in ecclesiastical circles, to oppose an association of their Orthodox brethren with the Catholic Croats, meant that in London the Russian attitude seemed ‘all important’. In fact, though, as the Russian position deteriorated during the summer of 1915, St. Petersburg became desperate to secure Bulgarian assistance and was happy to promise Croatia in return for Serbian sacrifices. But by then Italy had entered the war and strongly opposed a Serbo-Croat union.


"GREAT BRITAIN AND THE CREATION OF YUGOSLAVIA Negotiating Balkan Nationality and Identity" by JAMES EVANS, pp.159-164

[kiseli1]

When in August Pasic sought clarification of the territories offered, discussions were held to agree an Allied response. As a result Serbia was assured Bosnia, Srem, Bacska, part of southern Dalmatia (to be split with Montenegro), and Slavonia if it was in Allied hands, while the fate of Croatia was reserved. Essentially this was a British-brokered compromise between the Italian desire to restrict Serbian aggrandisement (and to forge a bond with Hungary), and the Russian position. British officials certainly did not view Croatia as rightful Serbian territory like Bosnia or southern Dalmatia. If justice was to be done to its distinct religious and historical identity, some form of consultation would be required. Union between Croatia and an enlarged Serbia would, Grey informed Nis in May, ‘naturally be a matter to be decided by the Croats themselves’ (though subject to their approval, he later wrote, Britain could ‘guarantee to facilitate the union’). Nevertheless, British solicitude for Croat self¬determination owed as much to Italian feelings as to those of Croats.
That sympathy for South Slav nationalism was firmly subordinate to military priorities was made amply clear by the terms of the Treaty of London in April 1915. British strategists convinced their superiors that Italian involvement would decisively affect the war. (It would be, Grey affirmed, ‘the turning point’ which would ‘very greatly hasten a successful conclusion’). On this basis the Cabinet agreed to promise Italy the territory she demanded in Istria and Dalmatia, with its 1.3 million Yugoslavs, and to press Russia to concur.It was inevitable, of course, that military imperatives seemed paramount. (One should indeed avoid importing ‘the ethical standards of tranquillity into the emotional atmosphere of danger’). At the same time it is not clear that Whitehall’s discomfort at the Italian terms was as acute as some officials subsequently liked to suggest. While the territory in question was known to be ethnologically more Slavic than Italian, and while it was regretted (for pragmatic reasons) that the Serbs should be further antagonised, few yet regarded ‘nationality’ as a presiding geopolitical principle. Clerk may in private have commented that Allied ministers would deserve ‘to be hanged’ unless Italy decisively tilted the balance of the war, but at his desk in Whitehall he brushed protests aside. ‘We cannot’, he asserted, ‘strain the principle of nationalities to the point of risking success in the war’. ‘We wish the war to be ended as far as possible on the basis of nationalities’, he minuted, ‘[...] but we did not set out on a Nationality Crusade’. ‘What we are doing’, wrote Grey, ‘is to take the best means to ensure that the Slavs get all but a fraction of their claims’, since without Italian cooperation ‘the Slavs might get less than nothing’. Any national boundary would have its ‘ragged fringes’.Territories offered to Serbia were still conceived, in other words, as reward for services to the Allied cause or as compensation for sacrifices elsewhere, rather than as rightfully hers on ethnic grounds. Pasic should appreciate, it was noted, that Serbian aspirations were now heeded to an extent ‘far beyond anything that seemed possible a few months ago’; he should recall the distance the British Government had travelled towards acceptance of aspirations hardly considered before outside Serbia itself. A Yugoslav Committee memorandum seemed to Clerk ‘almost menacing in its insistence on the Allied Powers creating a vast Yugo-Slav State’. Such a demand seemed not natural and principled but presumptuous and unrealistic. A draft message to Serbia was couched in language wholly conventional in its pragmatism: ‘the following territories are reserved for Serbia in the event of a successful war [...]’. And it was pointless, officials noted, to pretend otherwise. Would the Allies, the elder Nicolson asked rhetorically, continue fighting simply to uphold promises to Serbia? ‘We all know perfectly well’, wrote Lord Eustace Percy, ‘that we cannot and will not continue the war until Yugo-Slavia is constituted’. Whatever the vague encouragement given to pro-Yugoslav campaigners, this, in essence, remained Britain’s position until the eve of the armistice.
1916 saw Yugoslavia largely disappear as an issue for official Britain, just as it burgeoned in the popular consciousness. With Serbia conquered and its government in exile, Bulgaria allied with the Central Powers, and Italy making no impression on the southern front, the future disposition of the South Slav territories seemed uncertain. When the subject was raised, as when Alexander Karadjordjevic visited London in April, the principal concern was to avoid commitment. ‘It will be desirable’, warned Sir Arthur Nicolson, ‘to be very cautious as to what is said to the Crown Prince in respect to a Serbo-Croatian union’. (Of the various hints and assurances made during the frantic diplomacy of 1915 none, as things had turned out, was considered binding). There was scant official enthusiasm for the propaganda campaign launched to mark Kosovo Day in 1916, and unease at Lord Cromer’s appointment as President of the newly-formed Serbian Society (for fear that apparent government sponsorship might upset Italy). While Seton-Watson remained close to certain officials, his relations with the Foreign Office were increasingly strained. The British Ambassador in Italy criticised ‘certain people in England’ who saw themselves as ‘heaven- bom interpreters to other nations of what they ought to think’.
Nevertheless, the failure of the 1916 offensive did foster for the first time the possibility of a negotiated peace, and memoranda began to be drawn up considering the key principles of a European settlement. The most important of these, drawn up by Sir Ralph Paget and Sir William Tyrell, assumed a total Allied victory, and advocated the destruction of Austria-Hungary and South Slav unification. ‘We consider’, they wrote, ‘that Great Britain should in every way encourage and promote the union of Serbia, Montenegro, and the Southern Slavs into one strong federation of States with the view to its forming a barrier to any German advance towards the East’. Such ideas, if they were the logical conclusion of previous statements, were nevertheless much starker than most official thinking at this stage. (For one thing, prior to Russia’s collapse the break¬up of Austria seemed likely only to enhance the former’s already uncomfortable influence in Eastern Europe and the Near East).

[WarrenYoung]

Zoran Oštrić kaže:

Ako razlikujemo tri stupnja u bavljenju poviješću: činjenice, intepretacije (tu zapravo povdrazuijevam povezivanje s drugim činjenicama, da se shvati kontekst - a to se može raditi na razne načine, gledati iz raznih perspektiva koje mogu sve imati utemeljenje u stvarnosti) i vrednovanje, kad iznosiš da je to bila "ogromna istorijska greška" (a kako rekoh, slušao sam to i prije 30 godina), to je vrednovanje (naknadna pamet), kao i kad neki Hrvati danas žale, da je pristanak na Jugoslaviju bio povijesna greška.

Postojala jest alternativa da se jednostavno vojno zaposjedne što se može. General Simović, predstavnik Kraljevine Srbije, rekao je to predstavnicima Narodnoga vijeća kad je došao u Zagreb, sredinom studenoga, da je njegov zadatak kao vojnika zaposjesti vojno one teritorije, na koje Srbija polaže pravo.

S druge strane, naveo sam, a i drugi ovdje to ističu, da su onaq područja koja kontrolira Narodno viješe, Slovenija i SZ Hrvatska, puno ekonomski naprednija od Srbije, Bosne i dr.. Izgleda nezamisliovo, da jedan kralj ili predsjednik vlade odbiju priliku da zavladaju tim područjima, kad im se sama nude.

No mene je začudio i drugi tvo jstav, da je ideja dvojne federacije bia također totalno neprihvatljiva i da bi opet bilo bolje to jednostavno odbiti.

Moj je mišljenje da bi razumniji vladar mogao postaviti znatno bolje osnove za tu državu u samom početku. Spomenuo sam da je regent Aleksandar bio odgojen u Rusiji i pokušao slijediti način na koji su vladali Romanovi, ne naučivši ništa iz njihove sudbine. Razumniji vladar je mogao shvatiti, da Hratima mora dati neke ustupke, umjesto da pohapsi njihove političke lidere i šalje žandare da batinaju seljake.

Nije morao pristati baš na federaciju, bio je tada u dovoljno jakoj poziciji, ali neke ustupke je mogao dati.

I danas su Belgija i UK višenacionalne federacije i dobro funkcioniraju, a slično je bilo i sa Čehoslovačkom dugo vremena.

Naravno, vidio sam razne komentare ovih dana o toj temi i na srpskim sajtovima, i ranije se svako malo to spominje. Nakon sto godina neuspjeha, mnogi Srbi i dalje misle da je njihov problem da su previše popustljivi.

Mene čudi da ti za primer uzimaš neke druge višenacionalne federacije, a imali smo SFRJ kao višenacionalnu federaciju nakon WWII.
Znamo kako je završila.

Bila je federacija, pa su neke republike tražile još više samostalnosti, pa su dobile Ustav iz 1974 godine, pa su onda predlagale konfedereaciju...i na kraju je došlo do razlaza.
I to je sudbina Jugoslavije od osnivanja.

Jedni su je videli kao ostvarenje svojih ratnih ciljeva i još veću Veliku Srbiju, a drugi su hteli federaciju jer je federacija u nedostatku boljih rešenja, najkraći put do ostvarenja tisućuljetnog sna i konačne nezavisnosti.

I sad ti mene opet pitaj zašto mislim da je za Srbe 1918 godine federacija bila neprihvatljiva.

[Wikiceha]

WarrenYoung kaže:

Mene čudi da ti za primer uzimaš neke druge višenacionalne federacije, a imali smo SFRJ kao višenacionalnu federaciju nakon WWII.
Znamo kako je završila.
Bila je federacija, pa su neke republike tražile još više samostalnosti, pa su dobile Ustav iz 1974 godine, pa su onda predlagale konfedereaciju...i na kraju je došlo do razlaza.
I to je sudbina Jugoslavije od osnivanja.
Jedni su je videli kao ostvarenje svojih ratnih ciljeva i još veću Veliku Srbiju, a drugi su hteli federaciju jer je federacija u nedostatku boljih rešenja, najkraći put do ostvarenja tisućuljetnog sna i konačne nezavisnosti.
I sad ti mene opet pitaj zašto mislim da je za Srbe 1918 godine federacija bila neprihvatljiva.

Da su bile jasne granice, ne bi bilo rata.
Vi ste imali Kosovo i Vojvodinu u nekoj pat poziciji, a BiH je bila čardak ni na nebu ni na zemlji.
U RH su Srbi kojih je bilo nešto malo prijeko desetine pučanstva imali puno veću vlast nego što im je udjel u puku...
I to ti je to...
Da se znalo čije je što, problema ne bi bilo.
Pa pogledaj Sloveniju.

[lavore]

Dobro kaže bivši direktor CIA-e, Srbija 1914.godine je izvrstan primjer djelovanja "duboke države" https://theworldnews.net/ba-news/tko...ivsi-sef-cia-e

Knjigu koju spominje je prevedena i u nas https://www.vecernji.hr/kultura/apis...ski-rat-952760

[Babajagac]

Pojam "duboke države" bi se mogao odnositi i na današnju Srbiju. Ovako iz glave: pokušaj ubojstva Tuđmana,Mesića i Markovića;ubojstva generala JNA koji su se protivili velikosrpskim planovima, ubojstvo Stambolića, Đinđića:
ubojstvo Ćuruvije i drugih novinara, Arkana, pokušaj ubojstva Đukanovića, ubojstvo Ivanovića...
Čini se da duh Apisa još uvijek živi te da centri moći nisu tamo di bi trebali biti

[sedan]

Srbija je u 1-om svj. ratu bila prvenstveno pregaženo vojno. Pobijeđena do kraja da joj se i vojska i vlada evakuirala na Krf. I ne samo to, nesretnici su nakon prelaska albanskih planina umirali na malaričnoj albanskoj obali jer ih nitko nije prebacivao na grčke otoke. Tek kad je Rusija zaprijetila izlaskom iz rata, onda su poslali brodovem mahom talijanske i francuske da ih spasu.

Druga "baštinica" ( grohotom se smijem) tzv londonskog ugovora, Italija metra se nije mogla pomaknut i propalo joj je 12 ofanziva na Kobaridu, Tolminu i Soči gdje ih je držao Borojević s dalmatinskim i bosanskohercegovačkim jedinicama. A kad su došli Nijemci ( mladi Rommel) s njima potjerali su Talijane do Piave a bili bi idalje da nisu intervenirali francuski i britanski korpusi.

tako su saveznici vidili da su od ulaska Italije i od početka od Srbije imali samo štete i naknadnog truda i tzv londonski ugovor je bio u početku i ostao smijurija.

A šteta što ga nisu krenukli ranije relaizirat, ranije bi se riješili srpske hegemonije. Oni nisu bili u stanju držat Makedoniju u SHS i kraljevini..VMRO im je ubio na stotine žandara a na koncu i kralja.

[lavore]

Zadivljeni srpskim ratovanjem, Kanađani su 1918.godine jedan svoj planinski vrh nazvali Putnik, po načelniku srpskog Generalštaba i arhitektu srpskih pobjeda prvih godina rata, Radomiru Putniku. Danas suvremeni ravnogorci to obilato koriste http://www.rts.rs/page/magazine/sr/s...-u-kanadi.html
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Naš danas poznati političar Branimir Bunjac izvrsno zapaža u svom predstavljanju knjige Milana Zelenike RAT SRBIJE I CRNE GORE 1915.:"Poraz Srbije 1915/1916. važan je i za sagledavanje četničkoga pokreta u Drugom svjetskom ratu. Zapovjednik četnika Draža Mihailović sudjelovao je u tom porazu i to iskustvo djelomično može objasniti njegov kasniji prezir prema Britancima i taktiku „čekanja“ tj. izbjegavanja borbe s Nijemcima. Jednom prilikom je izjavio: „Opet bi Britanci htjeli da Srbi izginu za njihove interese, a da oni pritom ne moraju dati niti jedan metak.“
http://povijest.net/2018/?p=358

[Zoran Oštrić]

WarrenYoung kaže:

I sad ti mene opet pitaj zašto mislim da je za Srbe 1918 godine federacija bila neprihvatljiva.

Neću te više pitati. Zanimao me, onako usput, tvoj doživljaj svijeta na osnovu tih 100 godina povijesti. Nije od nekog značaja za povijest čovječanstva.

[Zoran Oštrić]

sedan kaže:

Srbija je u 1-om svj. ratu bila prvenstveno pregaženo vojno. Pobijeđena do kraja da joj se i vojska i vlada evakuirala na Krf. I ne samo to, nesretnici su nakon prelaska albanskih planina umirali na malaričnoj albanskoj obali jer ih nitko nije prebacivao na grčke otoke. Tek kad je Rusija zaprijetila izlaskom iz rata, onda su poslali brodovem mahom talijanske i francuske da ih spasu.

Druga "baštinica" ( grohotom se smijem) tzv londonskog ugovora, Italija metra se nije mogla pomaknut i propalo joj je 12 ofanziva na Kobaridu, Tolminu i Soči gdje ih je držao Borojević s dalmatinskim i bosanskohercegovačkim jedinicama. A kad su došli Nijemci ( mladi Rommel) s njima potjerali su Talijane do Piave a bili bi idalje da nisu intervenirali francuski i britanski korpusi.

tako su saveznici vidili da su od ulaska Italije i od početka od Srbije imali samo štete i naknadnog truda i tzv londonski ugovor je bio u početku i ostao smijurija.

A šteta što ga nisu krenukli ranije relaizirat, ranije bi se riješili srpske hegemonije. Oni nisu bili u stanju držat Makedoniju u SHS i kraljevini..VMRO im je ubio na stotine žandara a na koncu i kralja.

Ovakav način pisanja je usmjeren na to da izazove iritaciju i ljutnju ili pak podsmjeh i sarkazam, a ne da potakne suvislu diskusiju. Forumaš se rukovodi svoji ideološkim predrasudama i lošim emocijama prema Srbima i Talijanima i ne obazire se na činjenice. To je tipičan, školski primjer trolanja, upisa koji ide na miniranje a ne poticanje suvisle diskusije - toliko očit, da sam ga odlučio ostaviti kao primjer. Dao sam samo žuti karton - vjerojatno breblago.

[Zrakomlatski]

WarrenYoung kaže:

Tadasnje srpske vodje su bile glupe k'o ku....!

Danas se vidi u kakavu su agoniju uvele srpski narod posle 1914/1915 ne prihvatanjem ovih uslova i ponuda.....i to zarad cega?.....neke tamo Makedonije,gomile kamenja i polupustog zemljista naseljenog sa gomilama Bugara,Albanaca i Siptara koji ce stalno zabijati Srbiji i Srbima noz u ledja....

Stvarno neverovatno kakvi su bili balvani tada Pasic i company....